| The Meta-Problem of Consciousness |
33 |
| How and Why Consciousness Arises Some Considerations from Physics and Physiology |
8 |
| The Phi Measure of Integrated Information is not Well-Defined for General Physical Systems |
8 |
| 'I Have This Feeling of Not Really Being Here' Buddhist Meditation and Changes in Sense of Self |
7 |
| Minimal Self-Awareness from Within A Developmental Perspective |
6 |
| Beyond the 'Bayesian Blur' Predictive Processing and the Nature of Subjective Experience |
6 |
| Attributing Awareness to Others The Attention Schema Theory and Its Relationship to Behavioural Prediction |
4 |
| Is Consciousness Intrinsic? A Problem for the Integrated Information Theory |
4 |
| Interpretation-Neutral Integrated Information Theory |
3 |
| Bayesing Qualia Consciousness as Inference, Not Raw Datum |
3 |
| A Socio-Historical Take on the Meta-Problem of Consciousness |
3 |
| A Teleological Strategy for Solving the Meta-Problem of Consciousness |
3 |
| Ethnography of Meditation An Account of Pursuing Meditative Practice as a Tool for Researching Consciousness |
3 |
| The Universe in Consciousness |
2 |
| Bayesian Frugality and the Representation of Attention |
2 |
| Are There Degrees of Self-Consciousness? |
2 |
| On Scepticism about Unconscious Perception |
2 |
| The Cyclical Time of the Body and its Relation to Linear Time |
2 |
| How the Body Remembers its Skills Memory and Material Engagement |
2 |
| Implementation, Formalization, and Representation Challenges for Integrated Information Theory |
2 |
| Meditation and Altered States of Consciousness |
2 |
| Pristine Inner Experience While Silent Reading It's Not Silent Speaking of the Text |
2 |
| The Centre and Periphery of Conscious Thought |
2 |
| Consciousness and Cosmos Building an Ontological Framework |
2 |
| The Meta-Problem is The Problem of Consciousness |
2 |
| We Are Machines That Claim to Be Conscious |
2 |
| Easy Does It A Soft Landing for Consciousness |
2 |
| Anomalous Experiences, Mental Health, and Creativity Is Psi the Missing Link? |
2 |
| Russellian Monism, Introspective Inaccuracy, and the Illusion Meta-Problem of Consciousness |
2 |
| Underestimating the Physical |
2 |
| Chalmers' Meta-Problem |
2 |
| Welcome to Strong Illusionism |
2 |
| From 'Consciousness' to 'I Think, I Feel, I Know' A Commentary on David Chalmers |
1 |
| Idealization and Problem Intuitions Why No Possible Agent is Indisputably Ideal |
1 |
| No Problem Evidence that the Concept of Phenomenal Consciousness is Not Widespread |
1 |
| From Sensor Variables to Phenomenal Facts |
1 |
| Response to Chalmers' 'The Meta-Problem of Consciousness' |
1 |
| None of These Problems Are That 'Hard'... or 'Easy' Making Progress on the Problems of Consciousness |
1 |
| The Meta-Problem of Consciousness and the Evidential Approach |
1 |
| On the Meta-Problem |
1 |
| Non-propositional Contents and How to Find Them |
1 |
| Explaining Variation within the Meta-Problem |
1 |
| Undermining Belief in Consciousness |
1 |
| Generating Explanatory Gaps |
1 |
| Subjectivity as Self-Acquaintance |
1 |
| The Recurrent Model of Bodily Spatial Phenomenology |
1 |
| A Neurotheological Perspective on Altered States of Consciousness |
1 |
| The Transient Hypofrontality Theory of Altered States of Consciousness |
1 |
| Expanding the Scientific Study of Self-Experience with Psychedelics |
1 |
| Hypnosis as an Altered State of Consciousness |
1 |
